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Abstract
Recent innovations in the design of computer viruses have led to new trade-offs for the attacker.
Multiple variants of a malware may spread at different rates and have different levels of visibility to the
network. In this work we examine the optimal strategies for the attacker so as to trade off the extent
of spread of the malware against the need for stealth. We show that in the mean-field deterministic
regime, this spread-stealth trade-off is optimized by computationally simple single-threshold policies.
Specifically, we show that only one variant of the malware is spread by the attacker at each time, as
there exists a time up to which the attacker prioritizes maximizing the spread of the malware, and after
which she prioritizes stealth.
Index Terms
visibility, optimal contagion, malware epidemics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware (i.e., viruses, worms, trojans, etc.) has been a prominent feature of computer networks
since the 1980’s [1], and has evolved with the growing capabilities of computing technology.
Anderson et al. [2] estimated that malware caused $370m of damage globally in 2010 alone.
Traditionally, malware was designed with the express aim of infecting as many machines as
possible, leading to the mass epidemics of the early 2000’s (e.g., Blaster [3]). More recently, the
focus has shifted to more “surgical” strikes where visibility is highly undesirable, as awareness
can lead the intended target to cease communication (e.g., by quarantining the targets). The
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malware Regin was only discovered (in 2014) after operating since at least 2008, and was so
complex that even when its presence was detected, it was not possible to ascertain what it was
doing and what it was targeting [4]. Stuxnet, as another example, was designed to attack a
specific control software used in centrifuges [5] and did not steal or manipulate data, or receive
any command instructions from remote sources so as to maintain stealth [6]. Furthermore, its
very presence in a system was undetectable due to a rootkit [5]. Yet, it was discovered and
remedied after it spread outside its target area [7] (cf. Duqu, Flame, and Gauss [8]). Thus there
is a new critical trade-off for the attacker — to ensure maximum damage while minimizing
visibility to the defender.
We now describe different dimensions of this trade-off. Malware spreads from one computing
device to another when there is a communication opportunity between the devices. In networks,
both wired and wireless, inter-node communication can be visible to the network administrator,
and can serve as a way of detecting the presence of malware before its function is fully
understood. However, the attacker also has a conflicting onus to ensure the rapid propagation of
her program, as computer systems evolve at a rapid pace, and the exploit(s) that the malware
targets will be noticed and patched in due course. Furthermore, some malware designers work
to specific deadlines — e.g., Stuxnet was due to become inoperational in June 2012 [9]. On the
other hand, the second variant of Stuxnet was released to spread faster (and thus in a more risky
manner) after the designers were concerned about its limited spread [6]. Thus, an attacker will
seek to minimize her communication footprint while still trying to ensure the timely spread of
the malware.
In particular, we consider the case where two variants of a single emerging malware spread in
a network that is unaware of their existence. One spreads aggressively in every contact, and is
thus visible to the network due to its communications, while the other, passive, variant does not
spread subsequent to infecting a node. We assume that the network cannot determine the infection
state of any particular node and does not have patches to remedy the attack, but can detect an
attack by looking at the unusual communication patterns (e.g., the transfer of malware between
nodes) resulting from the malware attack. Coordinating distributed attacks comes at the cost of
added visibility due to communication and is susceptible to timing errors in the hosts. Thus, we
focus on the case where distributed nodes that are infected are not asked to coordinate, as was
the case in Regin and Stuxnet. The natural question that arises is to characterize the structure
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of the optimal malware variant mix that the attacker will spread at each instant depending on
their goal structures and the communication mechanisms that they may have at their disposal.
This is an imperative first step to devising remedies for such attacks.
A. Problem Description
We consider a network under attack by these two variants of a malware. Depending on their
infection status, nodes can be divided into 4 groups:1 Germinators (G), Susceptibles (S), Zombies
(Z), and Passives (P). We now describe these states, as well as their dynamics and the impact
of the attacker’s control (as will be elucidated in §III.A). We also outline an augmentation to
the model that is considered in §III.B and adds a further possible mechanism of interaction and
control to the dynamics:
1) Germinators (G):
- are a fixed (potentially very small) fraction of nodes, - are the only nodes under the attacker’s
direct control,
- are the only nodes that can choose how to interact with susceptibles and zombies depending
on the goal of the attacker: at each encounter with a susceptible, they decide whether to turn it
into a zombie or a passive, or to leave it as a susceptible.
- damage the network by executing malicious code,
- are visible to the network due to their communications.
- in an augmentation in §III.B, we add a further mechanism of interaction (halting) whereby
the germinators, upon contact with zombies, can turn them into passives (i.e., stopping them from
spreading the message any further). This can potentially lead to the attacker initially utilizing
epidemic spreading and then halting the spread once the marginal benefit of infection is overtaken
by the marginal effect of visibility, leading to to a potentially longer propagation of the zombies.
2) Susceptibles (S):
- are nodes that have not received any variant of the malware,
- upon receipt of the malware from germinators, they can turn into zombies (Z) or passives
(P ).
1Note that this classification and the resulting dynamics are an abstraction of real world networks and sacrifice some accuracy
for modeling simplicity. However, these assumptions are common in cybersecurity literature, e.g., [1], [10] and lead to significant
insight.
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- upon receipt of the malware from zombies, they will turn into zombies (Z).
3) Zombies (Z):
- have received the aggressive malware variant,
- damage the network by executing malicious code,
- will continue to propagate the aggressive variant indiscriminately (i.e., upon meeting a
susceptible, will turn into a zombie),
- are visible to the network due to their communications.
- in the augmentation in §III.B, the additional mechanism of halting can turn zombies into
passives.
4) Passives (P):
- have received the passive variant of the malware,
- damage the network by executing malicious code,
- will not propagate the malware variant any further,
- contrary to germinators and zombies, are invisible to the network as they do not communicate
with other nodes to spread the malware henceforth.
These states and their properties are summarized in Table I. We assume that all nodes mix
homogeneously (i.e., contacts between nodes are independent and exponentially distributed) with
rates that only depends on the infection states of the two nodes. Thus, all nodes that are in one
infection state can be assumed to be identical from the perspective of the malware. The purpose
of this abstraction is to simplify the interaction model for analysis in the population limit (i.e.,
as the number of nodes increases).
In these models, the attacker controls the mixture of zombie and passive malware variants
through the germinators under its direct control. Whenever a germinator meets a susceptible,
based on the control chosen by the attacker, it spreads either the zombie or passive variant of
the malware to the susceptible, or leaves it as it is. In the dynamics in §IV.B, the germinator has
an additional controlled mechanism of action, whereby upon meeting a node with the zombie
variant of the malware, it can replace the variant with the passive one (a “halting” mechanism).
These controls are assumed to be piecewise continuous, but they can take any value between
zero and one, which determines the percentage of relevant interactions for which the specified
action happens. We do not assume that all nodes make the same spreading decision at each time
instance: the attacker can assign a certain uniformly distributed and possibly varying fraction of
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State Visibility Growth over time Propagation
S N Only decrease -
G Y Fixed Y
Z Y Increase or decrease Y
P N Only increase N
TABLE I: The states of the SGZP model and their characteristics. “Visibility” denotes whether
the infection state of the node is detectable by the network defender. “Growth over time”
determines the possible changes in the fraction of nodes in each state over time (note that the only
case in which zombies can decrease is the dynamics outlined in §IV.B). Finally, “Propagation”
determines whether a node in that state can spread the malware to a susceptible node upon
contact.
germinators to make the same decision at each time, or it could allow all agents to make one
of the two decisions with a certain, possibly varying probability at each time. The outcome of
both cases is that a certain uniformly distributed percentage of interactions (derived from the
attacker’s controls) lead to the creation of zombies and passives, and the rest have no effect on
the potential target.
Later, we also investigate the effect of defense strategies on the optimal spread of malware
variants (§III.C). In these defense strategies, the defender limits the effective contacts of nodes
using a pre-determined function of malware visibility (which changes over time) as a means to
limit the spread of malware. We consider two classes of network defense functions: affine and
sigmoid. These defense strategies, however, come at the cost of stopping legitimate communi-
cation within the network. This is akin to choosing the communication ranges of nodes as a
decreasing function of the visibility of the malware, which is a form of quarantine.
We allow the attacker to choose the malware spreading controls so as to maximize a measure
of overall damage (described in §III.E). We first consider a damage function that depends on
a) malware efficacy, which is a function of the aggregate number of zombies and passives, and
b) malware visibility, which is a function of the number of zombies (for the models in §III.A
and §III.B). Then, we consider a damage function where malware efficacy is the attacker’s only
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direct concern, and is thus the damage function to be maximized, for the case where visibility
is built into the network dynamics through a network defense policy which is a function of the
fraction of zombies (as in the model in §III.C). These formulations, to the best of our knowledge,
have no precedent in the epidemics literature, and can be used to further investigate the effects
of malware visibility in networks.
An advantageous feature of all these models is that the malware designer only requires
synchronized actions from a fixed number of nodes that are under its control from the outset.
This decreases the risks of detection and policy implementation errors arising from coordinating
synchronized distributed actions among a varying set of nodes.
B. Results
We then derive necessary structures for optimal solutions for each of the cases, using Pontrya-
gin’s Maximum Principle and custom arguments constructed for each case (in §IV). We show
that the attacker’s optimal strategy in all of these models is for the germinators to spread only
one variant of the epidemic at each time: the germinators will create zombies up to a certain
threshold time, and then only create passives (including by halting zombies) from then on. That
is, the optimal controls are bang-bang (i.e., only taking their minimal and maximum values)
with only one jump. Note that the controls can take any value between 0 and 1 at each point
in time, and this bang-bang structure is one that emerges from the dynamics of the problem.
These structural results are without precedent in the literature, both due to the uniqueness of the
model, as well as the constraints placed on the vector of optimal controls.
It is interesting to note that in each of the variations we consider, our analysis reveals that all
the controls in each model have the same threshold, a fact that is not at all clear a priori. Thus
the entire control space can be described by one time threshold. This structure is invaluable for
deriving the optimal controls computationally (by solving the scalar optimization problem with
the state ODEs mapping the variable to the damage objective). Furthermore, the controls are
deterministic and easy to implement as the germinators need to be programmed with just one
time instant for all of their controls.
Finally, we investigate the performance of the derived optimal controls using numerical sim-
ulations (in §V). We first investigate the effect of the additional halting action on the optimal
attack policies. We show that for both the simple and halting models, as the rate of contact
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between zombies and susceptibles increases, zombies are created for a shorter time period. We
also show that the halting control adds to the length of time the zombie variant should optimally
be propagated, with the additional propagation time depending on some system parameters.
We then compare the optimal control with heuristics, and show that even without the halting
control, the optimal solution performs 10% better than the leading heuristic, with the performance
differential being larger for more naive heuristics. We then consider errors in the implementation
of the network defense strategy outlined in §III.C, and investigate their effects on the malware
spread. We show that erroneous estimations on the part of the defender only slightly affect the
damage inflicted by the attacker, which points towards the robustness of the attack policies to
errors in estimations by the network defense. Finally, we quantify the effect of synchronization
errors among the relatively small number of germinators on the efficacy of the malware attack.
We show that any such attack is robust to small errors among the germinators, sounding an
alarm to the fact that these malware attacks are less vulnerable to implementation issues that
may arise from synchronization errors than previous generations of malware.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Multiple interacting epidemics that spread among a single population have been considered
in the fields of biology (e.g., multiple strains of a viral epidemic [11], [12]) and sociology (e.g.,
competition among memes in a world with limited attention span [13]). The key distinction
between the control of biological epidemics [14]–[18] and that of malware ones is that in malware
epidemics the attacker can also decide to use her resources optimally and to adapt to foresee
the response of the defender. In the realm of sociology, the control of information epidemics
offers closer parallels to that of malware. For example, Kandhway and Kuri [19] model how
an erroneous rumor may be optimally stifled by the spread of correct information, which is
a secondary epidemic that interacts with the naturally occurring rumor epidemic. However, in
this case only one of the epidemics can be controlled, while the malware attacker can possibly
simultaneously control the spread of all malware variants. When there are multiple controllable
epidemics, the resulting simultaneous controls are interdependent, and focusing on one control
and characterizing its structure does not lead to a characterization of the optimal action. Thus,
in malware epidemics there are vectors of controls available to the attacker, which requires new
approaches and techniques compared to the other fields discussed.
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Even within the majority of malware epidemic models, e.g., [20]–[26], the spread of only
one malware has been examined, while we focus on the case where two variants are spreading
in conjunction with each other. This presents a fundamentally different choice to the attacker,
and so the model presented for the spread of visibility-heterogeneous malware variants has no
precedent in literature. Accordingly, the questions we asked and the solutions we obtained are
substantially different to prior work.
Note also that in nearly all malware epidemics, as well as the more generic epidemic models
mentioned, some form of the homogeneous mixing assumption is used to obtain tractable results.
While [27] provides one interesting avenue for the relaxation of the mean-field assumption in the
study of a given epidemic process, tractable results in the epidemic control domain still critically
rely on the mean-field assumption.
Nonetheless, we still distinguish other aspects of our work from those considering a single
type of malware: in these papers: 1- it is assumed that the attacker’s sole aim is to maximize the
spread of the malware, which is no longer the case for the emerging class of surgical malware
such as Regin [4] and Stuxnet [5] and 2- attackers have a mechanism to control the spread of
the malware remotely in the future, e.g., through a timer in the code which would be executed in
infected machines (as in [28]). Any such code would have to interact with the operating system
of the infected node, the configuration of which might not be known to the attacker, and can
thus create a point of failure for the malware. The failure of such a mechanism of control was
key to the overspread and subsequent remedy of Stuxnet [7].
Among the work on the control of a single-type/variant of malware (and the closely related
literature on the spread of a message in Delay Tolerant Networks [29], [30] and the spread of a
rumor [19]), the closest work to this topic (in terms of approach and spreading models) was in
two papers [26], [31]. In both papers, however, the authors assume that the malware can control
the transmission range of infected nodes2 and patching is the major defense of the network
2We assume that the control affects the mix of malware variants and that the communication ranges of nodes are outside the
malware’s control, perhaps even being controlled by the defender as a mitigation mechanism. Thus, the control and the trade-off
to the malware designer is fundamentally different.
8
and starts as soon as the epidemic spreads3. Thus, while the derived bang-bang structure of
the optimal controls is similar, their models and their results apply to a fundamentally different
class of malware, and the arguments used in deriving the results are only similar at the level of
using a classic Maximum Principle-derived switching function argument for constrained controls.
Furthermore, the adaptive defense model and the results on the simultaneity of 3 optimal control
switching times for the halting model are without precedent in the literature.
Finally, the very strict structure we prove for the vector of malware optimal control, which
restricts the search space for computational methods to a single parameter, is also without
precedent in any of the aforementioned literature.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND OBJECTIVE FORMULATION
In this section we model the spread of malware in a homogeneous network with random
contacts. This can be the case where malware spreads among mobile devices with proximity-
based communication, or where random contacts in an address-book are utilized. The virus
propagates in the network between times 0 and T . We represent the fraction of susceptible,
germinator, zombie, and passive nodes at time t with S(t), G(t), Z(t), and P (t) respectively,
and assume that they are differentiable functions of time. We assume that for any pair of states,
the statistics of meeting times between all pairs of nodes of those two states are identical and
exponentially distributed, where the mean is equal to the homogeneous mixing rate of those two
states. Groenevelt et al. [33] have shown that homogeneous mixing holds under the common
Random Way-point and Random Direction mobility models (when the communication range
of the fast-moving nodes is small compared to the total region). It has been shown [34], [35,
p.1] that the resulting evolution of such a set of state fractions (where state transitions occur
according to a Poisson contact process) will converge pathwise to the solution of a set of ordinary
differential equations derived from the dynamics in the population limit (i.e., in the mean-field)
on any limited time period (in particular, including the transient phase). In previous work, we
have shown that such approximations are reasonable even with populations as small as 40-160
3This may not be the case for an emerging stealthy epidemic like Stuxnet that is very large and extremely hard to decipher,
let alone mitigate [9], [32]. In our model, the network only becomes aware of the malware as it becomes more visible (i.e., as
the visible variant spreads).
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P
Zombie creation
γβZS + βGSuZ
βGSup
Passive creation
Halting zombies
piβGZuh
Fig. 1: The blocks represent the 4 states of nodes with regard to the malware. The solid black
lines show the dynamics in §III.A with the transition rates super-imposed. The green arrows
point from each source of malware to the resulting transition. The dotted red lines show the
additional halting action in §III.B. The model in §III.C has the same dynamics as the solid
black lines, but with β being a function of Z (i.e., β(Z)).
[29].4
Note that the zombies can be programmed to only spread the malware at a fraction of the
times they meet susceptibles, slowing their spread, or they can be programmed to use resources
that are not utilized by the rest of the network to spread faster. Therefore we take the mixing
rate between Z and S to be potentially different from the other pairs of states.
We describe the state dynamics of such systems as an epidemic for the cases where: 1)
germinator agents can only interact with susceptible agents (§III.A), 2) germinator agents can
also interact with zombies as well (§III.B), and 3) effective network contact rates are a function
of the infection spread, mirroring the response of a network defender (§III.C) (Figure 1). We
state and prove a key observation about all these dynamics (§III.D). We next formulate the
aggregate damage of attack efficacy and the ensuing visibility (§III.E). Finally, we lay out the
optimization problem in §III.F.
A. SGZP Model with no halting
The attacker can spread the malware in two ways: 1- upon encountering a susceptible, she can,
through the control variable uZ(t), turn that susceptible node into a zombie, i.e., one that will
4This work [29] also lays out a roadmap on how to partially relax the homogeneous mixing assumption in the current problem.
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henceforth propagate that infection to susceptibles it meets. 2- upon encountering a susceptible,
she can, through the control variable uP (t), turn that susceptible into a Passive, P . These control
variables — (uZ , uP ) ∈ U , where U is the set of piecewise continuous controls — can be thought
of as the probabilities that an interaction of a germinator and a susceptible at time t will lead to
the susceptible becoming a zombie and a passive respectively. To maintain such a probabilistic
intuition, we constrain their sum to be less than one.
S˙ = −βGS(uP + uZ)− γβZS (1a)
Z˙ = βGSuZ + γβZS (1b)
P˙ = βGSuP (1c)
uP + uZ ≤ 1 (2a)
0 ≤ uP ≤ 1 0 ≤ uZ ≤ 1 (2b)
Here, β is the mixing rate between S and G (which the attacker can calculate using time averages
of contact times), and γβ is the mixing rate between Z and S (with γ > 0). Thus, γ is the
relative secondary rate of spread of the malware. We consider all values of the parameter γ, with
an associated trade-off: if γ is high, the zombies spread too fast and increase visibility, while if
γ is low, the malware does not spread to cause significant damage.
B. SGZP Model with halting
This model is akin to the previous one, with one more mechanism added: germinator nodes
(G) can force a zombie (Z) to become passive (P) through a process we will call ‘‘halting”.
This happens through another control variable uh, which, in keeping with the intuition, can be
thought of as the probability of halting encountered zombies at each instant. Again, we take
(uZ , uP , uh) ∈ U ′, where U ′ is the set of piecewise continuous controls. The system dynamics
become:
S˙ = −βGS(uP + uZ)− γβZS (3a)
Z˙ = βGSuZ + γβZS−piβGZuh (3b)
P˙ = βGSuP+piβGZuh, (3c)
with 0 < pi ≤ 1 signifying the extent to which the zombies can be stopped when encountered by
the original germinators. This model is similar to the Daley-Kendall rumor model [36], where
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repeated interaction with active agents can turn an active spreader of the rumor into an agent
that is aware of the rumor, but has no interest in spreading it any further. The constraints now
become:
uP + uZ ≤ 1 (4a)
0 ≤ uP ≤ 1, 0 ≤ uZ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ uh ≤ 1. (4b)
C. SGZP Model with no halting and adaptive defense
Instead of allowing a constant rate of interactions β, the network defender can choose the
effective mixing rate β to be a function of the fraction of zombies as her defense policy (β(Z)).
In these policies, the network defender regulates the rate of contact between nodes based on the
proportion of zombie nodes it has observed. While the network cannot determine which nodes
have been compromised, it can determine the fraction of the network that has been infected by
zombies by observing the chatter among nodes and the extra communications whose purpose
is unknown, either in the whole network or among a representative subset of nodes. If these
illicit communications are significant enough to attract the network defender’s attention, they can
implement a quarantine defense policy, captured by β(Z), which will be a function of likelihood
the malware is detected, and which will decrease the spread of the malware.
We consider the system dynamics described in the no-halting model, and adapt them accord-
ingly:
S˙ = −β(Z)GS(uP + uZ)− γβ(Z)ZS (5a)
Z˙ = β(Z)GSuZ + γβ(Z)ZS (5b)
P˙ = β(Z)GSuP (5c)
The controls available are also the same as those in (2). In particular, they are still assumed
to be piecewise continuity.
We consider two classes of β(Z) functions: 1) Affine functions, of the form β(Z) = −aZ +
βmax for 0 ≤ a ≤ βmax (a natural assumption, as the contact rate cannot be negative). If
a = 0, the affine case simplifies to the constant β case. 2) Exponential sigmoids, of the form
βZ =
β0
1 + eα(Z−Zth)
, with 0 < Zth < 1 being a fixed threshold and α > 0 denoting the sharpness
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of the cut-off. As α increases, β(Z) can become arbitrarily close to β(Z) = β01Z≤Zth , an all-
or-nothing policy. Both of these classes satisfy β(Z) > 0 for all Z (i.e., the network never
shuts down completely due to the infection) and dβ(Z)
dZ
< 0 for all Z (except for the trivial case
of constant β(Z)), as more visibility should lead to more communication restrictions from the
network. In mobile epidemics, this is equivalent to nodes decreasing their communication range
upon the detection of an infection, e.g. as in [37]. In practice, the network will have an estimate
Zˆ of the fraction of zombies. Our simulations reveal that the sub-optimality induced by the
estimation error is small (§V).
D. Key observations
We start with a theorem that holds for all the models presented above, and which will be used
as a building block to obtain structural results in §IV.
Theorem 1. For a system with the mechanics described in either §III.A, §III.B, or §III.C, with
initial conditions S(0) = S0 > 0, G(0) = G0 > 0, Z(0) = Z0 ≥ 0, and P (0) = P0 ≥ 0, and
S0 + G0 + Z0 + P0 = 1, and with piecewise continuous controls uP , uZ (and in (3), uh), the
dynamical systems (1), (3), and (5) have unique state solutions (S(t), G(t), Z(t), P (t)), with
S(t) > 0, Z(t) ≥ 0, P (t) ≥ 0, and (S +G+ Z + P )(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
The assumptions S0 > 0 and G0 > 0 are natural, otherwise there is no interaction to control.
Henceforth, we will assume these, as well as Z0 ≥ 0 and P0 ≥ 0.
Proof: The uniqueness follows from standard results in the theory of ordinary differential
equations [38, Theorem A.8, p. 419] given the observation that the RHS of the dynamic systems
is comprised of quadratic forms and is thus Lipschitz over [0, T ]×S, where S is the set of states
such that the boundary conditions hold.
We provide the proof for the case of §III.A, and note the changes for §III.B. First of all,
(S˙ + Z˙ + P˙ )(t) = 0 and (S + Z + P )(0) = 1 − G0, so (S + G + Z + P )(t) = 1 for all
t. We know that S˙ = −βGS(uP + uZ) − γβZS ≥ −MS, where M is the upperbound of
βG + γβZ (because (uP + uZ) ≤ 1). Therefore, S(t) ≥ S0e−Mt > 0 for all t. Therefore,
Z˙ = βGSuZ + γβZS ≥ γβZS ≥ MZ, where M is a lowerbound on γβS which exists due
to continuity (respectively, Z˙ = βGSuZ + γβZS − piβZGuh ≥ Z(γβS − βpiGuh) ≥ M ′Z,
where M ′ is a lowerbound on (γβS − βpiGuh) which again exists due to continuity). Note
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that the first inequality resulted from uZ(t) ≥ 0 for all t. Therefore, Z(t) ≥ Z0eMt ≥ 0
(respectively Z(t) ≥ Z0eM ′t ≥ 0) for all t. Finally, P˙ = βGSuP ≥ 0 for all t (respectively,
P˙ = βGSuP + piβZGuh ≥ 0 for all t), as uZ(t) ≥ 0, so P0 ≥ 0 leads to P (t) ≥ 0 for all t.
Theorem 1 can be proved very similarly for the model in §III.C using the reasoning we used
for the model in §III.A, with the difference that in the arguments, β is replaced by β(Z), which
is lower-bounded away from zero for positive Z.
E. Utility Function
As we discussed, the attacker tries to maximize attack efficacy while minimizing visibility.
We capture efficacy as a function f(·) of the aggregate number of zombies (Z) and passives
(P ) at each time instant. Meanwhile, visibility is only a function of zombies that re-spread the
malware, as that is the only time the malware is detectable. Visibility increases the likelihood that
the network defender detects the malware and takes defensive actions. This means that we can
capture instantaneous visibility as a function g(·) of the number of zombies at that instant. While
the attacker cannot in general measure the malware’s visibility, she can choose g(·) based on how
detrimental detection would be for her purposes. This formulation is comprehensive because the
fixed number of germinators (G) both cause damage and are visible, and are implicitly a term
that is added to the variable of both functions. This leads to the following aggregate damage
function that the attacker seeks to maximize:
J =
∫ T
0
(f(Z(t) + P (t))− g(Z(t))) dt. (6)
We have some natural assumptions on f(.) and g(.): f(0) = g(0) = 0, with dg(Z)
dZ
> 0 and
∂f(Z+P )
∂Z
= ∂f(Z+P )
∂P
> 0.
We assume that f(x) is concave, which means that incremental damage does not increase as
the number of infected agents increases [i.e., the pay-off per infected agent decreases].
In §IV.A: We assume g(x) is convex. This means that an increment in the zombies is costlier
(results in more visibility) when the infection is already more visible. This could be the case
when the network becomes more wary of the infection as it progresses and becomes more visible.
In §IV.B: We simplify g to be linear, g(x) = kgx, kg > 0.
In §IV.C: We set g(x) ≡ 0, as the effects of visibility have been built into the network dynamics
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through β(Z). This leaves us with:
J =
∫ T
0
f(Z(t) + P (t)) dt. (7)
F. Problem statement
In §IV.A and §IV.C, the attacker seeks to choose controls (uZ , uP ) ∈ U satisfying (2) so as
to maximize J (respectively, (6) and (7)), while in §IV.B, she seeks to maximize J (6) through
a choice of (uZ , uP , uh) ∈ U ′ that satisfies (4).
IV. STRUCTURAL RESULTS
Using Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle and custom arguments specific to each case, we obtain
the one-jump bang-bang structure of the optimal controls for the various cases in §III.A, §III.B,
and §III.C. We provide the proof for §IV.A in the main text (§IV.D) and the ones for §IV.B and
§IV.C in the appendices (§Appendix A and §Appendix B respectively).
Intuition is unclear in determining these structures: while intuitively creating zombies at the
beginning of the time period allows the malware to benefit from their epidemic spread, it also
penalizes the malware more because of its prolonged visibility. This is further complicated by the
fact that the controls can take any value between 0 and 1, and thus it is possible for the attacker
to have any mix of malware spread at each instance in time. The strict structures that arise from
the analysis are counter-intuitive and interesting both theoretically and from an implementation
standpoint.
A. Results for the no halting model (proved in §IV.D)
Theorem 2. Any optimal control in U will satisfy
uP (t) =

0 t ∈ [0, t∗)
1 t ∈ (t∗, T )
uZ(t) =

1 t ∈ [0, t∗)
0 t ∈ (t∗, T )
for some t∗ ∈ [0, T ).
This result means that for any optimal control, there exists a time threshold t∗ such that prior
to t∗, the germinators convert all the susceptibles they encounter to zombies, and subsequent to
it they convert the susceptibles to passives.
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The fact that creating zombies starts from the initial time for all interactions, that passives are
created for a time period leading up to the terminal time for all interactions, and that the switch
between creating zombies and passives is instantaneous – with no gap between, and no over-lap
in, the intervals in which these variants are propagated, as well as no intermediate propagation
rates – is not at all a priori obvious.
Note that we prove a necessary condition for any optimal control, thus reducing the search
space of controls from a vector of functions to a scalar (t∗). This is a cause for concern, as
the latter is much more computationally tractable for the attacker, and shows that any optimal
policy will also be simple for the attacker to execute. The attacker can execute the optimal policy
by optimizing the ODE (1), just varying the scalar parameter t∗, and then coding t∗ into the
germinators, which are the only nodes that execute the control.
B. Results for the halting model (proved in §Appendix A)
Theorem 3. Any optimal control in U ′ will satisfy
uP (t) = uh(t) =

0 t ∈ [0, t∗)
1 t ∈ (t∗, T )
uZ(t) =

1 t ∈ [0, t∗)
0 t ∈ (t∗, T )
for some t∗ ∈ [0, T ), except in the case where Z(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], in which case uh can
be arbitrary with the other two structures holding.
This means that there exists a time threshold t∗ such that prior to t∗, the germinators again
convert all the susceptibles they encounter to zombies while not halting any zombies they meet,
and subsequent to it they convert both the susceptibles and zombies they encounter to passives.
Here, the added halting control can be used to slow the spread of zombies.
The fact that the same result as Theorem 2 holds for uZ and uP in the presence of uh is not
clear a priori. Furthermore, the fact that the halting optimal control is bang-bang and that the
switching time is the same as the other controls is surprising.
C. Results for the adaptive defense model
Theorem 2 holds (with the difference that t∗ ∈ [0, T ]) for constant, affine, and sigmoid β(Z).
This is remarkable given that here, β changes as a function of Z. This result is proved in
§Appendix B.
16
D. Proof of Theorem 2 for the no halting model
Proof: This proof utilizes the necessary conditions for an optimal control derived from
Pontryagin’s maximum principle. In particular, we explicitly characterize the optimal controls
as functions of the optimal states and co-states (akin to Lagrange multipliers). Subsequently, we
start at terminal time, where the co-states are known, and follow their evolution backward in
time till we arrive at the initial time, thereby implicitly characterizing the necessary structure of
the optimal controls.
Define continuous co-states (λS, λP , λZ , λ0) such that at points of continuity of the controls:
λ˙S = β[(λS − λP )GuP + (λS − λZ)GuZ + (λS − λZ)γZ]
λ˙Z = −f ′(Z + P ) + g′(Z) + (λS − λZ)γβS
λ˙P = −f ′(Z + P ), (8)
with final co-state constraints:
λS(T ) = λZ(T ) = λP (T ) = 0. (9)
Towards characterizing properties of optimal solutions, we define the Hamiltonian as:
H(t) := λ0(f(Z + P )− g(Z)) + (λP − λS)βGSuP
+(λZ − λS)βGSuZ + (λZ − λS)γβZS. (10)
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle [38, p.182] states that any optimal control vector u∗ must
satisfy the following necessary conditions:
(λS, λP , λZ , λ0) 6= ~0, λ0 ∈ {0, 1}, (11)
∀u∈U ,t∈[0,T ] H(S∗, Z∗, P ∗, u∗, λS(t), λP (t), λZ(t), λ0, t) ≥
H(S∗, Z∗, P ∗, u, λS(t), λP (t), λZ(t), λ0, t). (12)
But if λ0 = 0, (λS(T ), λP (T ), λZ(T ), λ0) = ~0, a contradiction, so λ0 = 1.
1) Structure of the optimal control: If we define:
ϕP = (λP − λS)βGS (13a)
ϕZ = (λZ − λS)βGS, (13b)
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then, the Hamiltonian becomes:
H(t) = f(Z + P )− g(Z) + ϕPuP + ϕZuZ
+(λZ − λS)γβZS. (14)
The maximization of the Hamiltonian (12), added to the sum constraints for the controls (2a),
leads to the following optimality conditions for the controls:5
(uP , uZ) =

(0, 0) ϕP < 0, ϕZ < 0 (15a)
(1, 0) ϕP > 0, ϕP > ϕZ (15b)
(0, 1) ϕZ > 0, ϕZ > ϕP (15c)
(?, ?) ϕZ = ϕP ≥ 0 (15d)
(?, 0) ϕP = 0, ϕZ < 0 (15e)
(0, ?) ϕZ = 0, ϕP < 0 (15f)
From (13) and the state (1) and costate (8) evolution equations and after some manipulations,
we have:6
ϕ˙P = β[GuZ(ϕZ − ϕP ) + γZ(ϕZ − ϕP )−GSf ′(Z + P )]
ϕ˙Z = β[GS(g
′(Z)− f ′(Z + P ))
+GuP (ϕP − ϕZ)− γSϕZ ] (16a)
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = −(ϕP − ϕZ)(βGuZ + γβZ + βGuP )
−βGSg′(Z) + γβSϕZ , (16b)
2) Proof methodology outline: From here on, we will use the necessary optimality conditions
to obtain timing conditions for phase transitions among the conditions in (15). We show that a
time t∗ exists such that, for t ∈ (t∗, T ), we have uP (t) = 1 and uZ(t) = 0 (§IV.D.3). If t∗ = 0,
we have finished characterizing optimal controls. If not (i.e., t∗ > 0), we prove that a time t′′
exists such that for t ∈ (t′′, t∗), we have uP (t) = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 (in §IV.D.4). Finally, we show
5The question marks (?) denote singular controls. These can occur when the coefficient of a control variable in the augmented
Hamiltonian (which includes the constraints) is zero over an interval, and thus the control has no effect on the Hamiltonian
maximizing condition of the PMP.
6g′(Z) := dg(Z)
dZ
, f ′(Z + P ) := ∂f(Z+P )
∂Z
= ∂f(Z+P )
∂P
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that t′′ must be equal to zero (in §IV.D.5), leading to all possible optimal controls agreeing with
the structure laid out in Theorem 2.
3) Time interval leading up to T and the existence of t∗: We now follow the evolution of
ϕZ and ϕP for a time interval leading to T in order to characterize necessary conditions for the
optimal controls and to prove the existence of t∗. From the terminal time costate conditions (9):
ϕP (T ) = ϕZ(T ) = 0,
ϕ˙P (T
−) = −f ′((Z + P )(T−))βGS(T−) < 0,
ϕ˙P (T
−)− ϕ˙Z(T−) = −βGS(T−)g′(Z(T−)) < 0.
Therefore, ϕP (t) > max{ϕZ(t), 0} for some interval leading up to T due to the continuity of
the states and costates and using the definition of a left derivative. Let (t∗, T ) be the largest
interval over which this holds for t ∈ (t∗, T ) for some t∗ < T , leading to the fact that for all
such t, uP (t) = 1 and uZ(t) = 0 due to (15b).
For t ∈ (t∗, T ), (16) becomes:
ϕ˙P = −βGSf ′(Z + P ) + γβZ(ϕZ − ϕP ) (17a)
ϕ˙Z = βGS(g
′(Z)− f ′(Z + P )) + βG(ϕP − ϕZ)− γβSϕZ (17b)
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = γβSϕZ − (ϕP − ϕZ)(γβZ + βG)−βGSg′(Z). (17c)
Recall that ϕP (t) > 0 for t ∈ (t∗, T ), so due to continuity, we either have ϕP (t∗) > 0 or
ϕP (t
∗) = 0. We now rule out ϕP (t∗) = 0. If ϕP (t∗) = 0, Rolle’s Mean Value Theorem [39,
p. 215] applies over the interval (t∗, T ): as ϕP (t∗) = ϕP (T ) = 0 and ϕP is continuous and
differentiable over this interval, there must exist τ ∈ (t∗, T ) such that ϕ˙P (τ) = 0. However,
from (17a), it can be seen that ϕ˙P (t) < 0 for t ∈ (t∗, T ), a contradiction. Therefore, ϕP (t∗) > 0.
Thus, either t∗ = 0 or ϕZ(t∗) = ϕP (t∗). If t∗ = 0, due to (15b), we have uP (t) = 1 and
uZ(t) = 0 for all t which agrees with the structure in Theorem 2, so henceforth we focus on
the case where ϕZ(t∗) = ϕP (t∗) > 0.
First, we derive a property that will prove useful later on. We have Z˙(t) ≥ 0 from (1b) and
Theorem 1, and thus due to the convexity of g(·) for t < t∗:
Gg′(Z(t∗))
γ
≥ Gg
′(Z(t))
γ
. (18)
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Next, Z(t∗) can either be equal to zero or strictly positive. We first show that if Z(t∗) = 0,
the structure holds.
If Z(t∗) = 0, we have Z˙ = γβSZ for t ∈ (t∗, T ) as uZ(t) = 0 in this interval. Consider
M1 > 0 to be an upper-bound on the continuous γβS in this interval, so we must have Z(t) ≤
Z(t∗)eM1(t−t
∗) = 0, and therefore Z(T ) = 0 due to continuity and the uniqueness of solutions
of first-order initial value problems. Thus, as Z˙ ≥ 0 for t ∈ (0, T ), we must have Z˙ = 0 over
this interval, which from (1b) and Theorem 1 leads to uZ(t) = 0 for t ∈ (0, T ) and Z0 = 0.
This also means that from (17a), ϕ˙P (t) = −βGSf ′(Z + P ) < 0 in this interval, leading to
ϕP (t) > ϕP (T ) = 0, and from (15), to uP (t) = 1 over this interval. Thus, again t∗ = 0, agreeing
with the structure predicted by Theorem 2. So from now on we will consider Z(t∗) > 0.
Now, we examine g′(Z(t∗))− f ′((Z +P )(t∗)), noting that it can either be positive or strictly
negative, and investigate both cases in turn.
If g′(Z(t∗)) − f ′((Z + P )(t∗)) ≥ 0, then g′(Z(t)) − f ′((Z + P )(t)) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ (t∗, T ).
This is because from (1), P˙ (t) + Z˙(t) ≥ 0 and Z˙(t) ≥ 0 over this interval, which coupled with
the convexity of g(·) and −f(·) in their arguments gives the aforementioned result. From (17b)
and the definition of t∗, ϕ˙Z > −γβSϕZ ≥ −M2ϕZ in this interval, with M2 > 0 being an
upper-bound on γβS. Therefore, ϕZ(t∗) ≤ ϕZ(T )e−M2(t∗−T ) = 0 due to an integral argument,
which means that ϕP (t∗) > 0 ≥ ϕZ(t∗). Note that this would contradict the starting assumption
of this segment, which was ϕP (t∗) = ϕZ(t∗)
Therefore, from here on we will examine the case of g′(Z(t∗)) < f ′((Z + P )(t∗)).
4) Time interval leading up to t∗ > 0 and the existence of t′′: We now look at the evolution of
ϕZ and ϕP for a time interval leading to t∗ > 0, and show that t′′ exists such that t for t ∈ (t′′, t∗),
we have uP (t) = 0 and uZ(t) = 1. Furthermore, in these cases we showed ϕZ(t∗) = ϕP (t∗),
Z(t∗) > 0, and g′(Z(t∗)) < f ′((Z + P )(t∗)). At such a point t∗, from (16a) and the continuity
of the states and co-states:
(ϕ˙P (t
∗+)− ϕ˙Z(t∗+)) = βS(t∗)[γϕZ(t∗)−Gg′(Z(t∗))]. (19)
Now, (19) should be positive, because if this derivative was strictly negative, the definition of
the right-derivative would show that ϕZ(t) > ϕP (t) for t in an interval starting from t∗, a
contradiction. Because from Theorem 1, S(t∗) > 0, so βS(t∗)[γϕZ(t∗)−Gg′(Z(t∗))] ≥ 0 and:
ϕZ(t
∗) ≥ Gg
′(Z(t∗))
γ
. (20)
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Now, we can see from a continuity argument on (16a) (given that ϕZ(t∗) = ϕP (t∗) > 0) that
ϕ˙Z(t
∗−) < 0. Thus ϕZ(t) > ϕZ(t∗) for some interval leading up to t∗ due to the definition of a
left-derivative.
From (16a), (18), and (20), we must have: ϕZ(t) >
Gg′(Z(t))
γ
for t in some interval leading
up to t∗. Let (t′, t∗) be the maximal such interval. In this interval, from (16b), ϕ˙P−ϕ˙Z > −(ϕP−
ϕZ)(γβZ+βG) ≥ −M3(ϕP −ϕZ), where M3 > 0 is an upper-bound on the continuous expres-
sion γβZ+βG. So for any t in this interval, (ϕP (t)−ϕZ(t)) < (ϕP (t∗)−ϕZ(t∗))e−M3(t−t∗) = 0.
Thus, ϕP (t) < ϕZ(t) for t ∈ (t′, t∗). As ϕZ(t∗) > 0, due to the continuity of the states and
co-states, there exists a maximal interval (t′′, t∗) such that ϕZ(t) > max{ϕP (t), 0}. Following
from (15c), for t ∈ (t′′, t∗) we must have uP (t) = 0 and uZ(t) = 1.
5) Proof that t′′ = 0: If t′′ = 0, the above concludes our specification of the structure, which
agrees with Theorem 2. Thus, henceforth we assume t′′ > 0, and thus either ϕZ(t′′) = ϕP (t′′)
or ϕZ(t′′) = 0.
For t ∈ (t′′, t∗), (16) becomes:
ϕ˙P = β[−GSf ′(Z + P ) +G(ϕZ − ϕP ) + γZ(ϕZ − ϕP )] (21a)
ϕ˙Z = β[GS(g
′(Z)− f ′(Z + P ))− γSϕZ ] (21b)
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = β[γSϕZ − (ϕP − ϕZ)(G+ γZ)−GSg′(Z)], (21c)
Now, for t ∈ (t′′, t∗), g′(Z(t)) − f ′((Z + P )(t)) < g′(Z(t∗)) − f ′((Z + P )(t∗)) < 0. This is
because Z˙(t) > 0 as uZ(t) = 1, and P˙ (t) = 0 as uP (t) = 0, so g(·)−f(·) is convex in the strictly
increasing Z in this interval. So from (21b), ϕ˙Z < −γβSϕZ ≤ −M4ϕZ with M4 > 0 being the
upper-bound of the continuous γβS, and therefore for all t ∈ (t′′, t∗), ϕZ(t) ≥ ϕZ(t∗)e−M4(t−t∗),
and therefore by continuity, ϕZ(t′′) ≥ ϕZ(t∗)e−M4(t′′−t∗). Thus, we can conclude that ϕZ(t′′) > 0,
as ϕZ(t∗) > 0.
So for t′′ > 0, we must have ϕP (t′′) = ϕZ(t′′). In this case, we have (ϕ˙P (t′′+)−ϕ˙Z(t′′+)) ≤ 0,
as if it is strictly positive, an integral argument will lead to a contradiction with ϕP (t) < ϕZ(t)
for t ∈ (t′′, t∗). Using the continuity of the states and co-states and as from Theorem 1, S(t′′) > 0,
(21b) becomes:
ϕ˙P (t
′′+)− ϕ˙Z(t′′+) = βS(t′′)[γϕZ(t′′)−Gg′(Z(t′′))] ≤ 0
⇒ ϕZ(t′′) ≤ Gg
′(Z(t′′))
γ
, (22)
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We know that for all t ∈ (t′′, t∗), g′(Z(t)) − f ′(Z + P (t)) < 0, so from (21b), ϕ˙Z(t) <
−γβSϕZ < −M5ϕZ < 0, where M5 > 0 is an upper-bound on the continuous γβS. Thus,
ϕZ(t
′′) > ϕZ(t∗). (23)
But (18), (22), and (23) lead to ϕZ(t∗) <
Gg′(Z(t∗))
γ
, which contradicts (20).
Thus t′′ = 0, and this concludes our specification of the structure of the optimal controls
which conform to the structure set out in Theorem 2.
V. SIMULATION
In the preceding sections, we showed that the optimal spreading controls of the malware in
all of the described settings can be fully described by a scalar parameter t∗. In this section, we
investigate the variation of t∗ with respect to some system parameters and then compare the
relative performance of the optimal spreading controls with simple heuristics (§V.A).7 In these
studies, the main parameter of variation is γ, as a higher γ indicates that zombies spread at
a faster rate than infection via germination, and thus γ represents a measure of the virility of
the zombie malware variant. Varying γ changes the relative contact rates internal to the model
and thus represents different possible dynamics of a malware attack. In contrast, varying β, the
contact rate of germinators and susceptibles, changes the number of contacts across the board,
which is equivalent to changing T . Thus any variation of β would only show how t∗ changes
for a specific epidemic. Finally, we numerically investigate the fragility of the optimal control
to network estimation errors in the adaptive defense model and to synchronization errors among
germinators (§V.B).
A. Structure of the optimal malware spread controls and their performance vs heuristics
We first computed t∗ (the optimal switching time) as a function of the relative spread rate of
the zombies γ for the problems in §III.A and §III.B (with different values of halting efficacy
pi), as well as the optimal controls, for a cost function for which both Theorem 2 and 3 apply
(Figure 2). As γ increases, zombies are created for a shorter period due to the rapid explosion of
7Stealth conscious epidemics are an emerging threat, and while more data is available now than before, their very nature
makes real spreading data hard to come by and a topic of active research, even years after the fact. Thus, our numerical studies
are based on simulations with parameters that are justified based on their real-world implication.
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their population later on. Furthermore, the addition of a halting control and its increased efficacy
leads to the attacker creating zombies for longer, as she can control their spread (and thus their
visibility) later on using the halting control.
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Fig. 2: We compared t∗ (the length of time the zombie control uZ was equal to one) for the optiml
no halting and halting controls as the secondary rate of spread of the zombies (γ) was varied.
Here, β = 2, T = 5,(S0, G0, Z0, P0) = (0.99, 0.01, 0, 0), f(x) = x0.5, and g(x) = kgx = 0.7x.
We then compared the cost of these two optimal controls to that of simple heuristics: for the
model in §III.A, Always Zombie and Always Passive represent the two most extreme policies
- Always Zombie sets uZ(t) = 1 and uP (t) = 0 for all times, while Always Passive does the
exact opposite. Thus, in these heuristics the germinators only ever propagate one fixed type of
malware variant. In the Optimal Static Mixing heuristic, the attacker chooses a fixed ratio for uZ
and uP at all times. Our optimal controls are titled No Halting and Halting, the latter indexed
by the value of pi (which represents the relative success of the germinators in halting zombies).
The efficacy of the policies is evaluated as γ, the relative propagation rate of the zombies is
varied (Figure 3, which is presented for the same parameters as those used in Figure 2).
The optimal controls perform much better than the heuristics, with the halting control outper-
forming the no-halting control for by as much as 10% for large values of pi (where the halting
control is efficient) and γ (where the zombie variant propagation is rapid), both factors which
penalize sub-optimal decision-making. This vindicates the assumption that the attacker would be
wise to utilize the halting control were it to be available. Out of the simple heuristics, optimal
static mixing has the maximum utility, which is typically 10% below that of even the no-halting
optimal control.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of the damage utilities across the optimal controls and heuristics for the
parameters of Fig. 2.
B. Fragility of the optimal damage to network estimation errors and synchronization errors in
the germinators
We then investigated how the optimal control would fare when the network, which is capable of
adaptive defense (i.e., the model in §III.C), has an erroneous estimate of the fraction of zombies
(Figure 4). The optimal attack policy is derived with the assumption that the network’s defense
policy is based on the correct observation of the visibility of the epidemic (i.e., the fraction
of zombies), information that is rarely available. Figure 4 shows that the optimal control is
remarkably robust to the network’s estimation errors up, with an error of 5% even when the
estimation error is 40%. In many cases, the performance is much better.
Finally, we examined how synchronization errors among the germinators would affect the
utility of the malware. One of the benefits of the malware spread models was that they assumed
that only this small fraction of nodes, which is under the direct control of the attacker, has to
coordinate their actions. To examine the fragility of the optimal control to this coordination, once
the optimal policy is derived, random errors are introduced to the clocks of the germinators, and
the resulting utilities are compared over 100 runs of the simulation (Figure 5). As can be seen,
the damage of both the no halting (pi = 0) and halting (pi = 0.5) cases is distributed around
the damage obtained by the calculated optimal control, and only suffers a 10-15% performance
drop for synchronization errors of up to 30% of t∗ in the small number of germinators.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the synchronized infinite-node optimal control can actually
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Fig. 4: The network was assumed to make unbiased random estimation errors at each time instant
with the range depicted on the x-axis. The solid line shows the average difference in damage
relative to the optimal over 50 runs of the estimating network. Here, we used an exponential
sigmoid β(Z) with β0 = 1, α = 100, T = 15, γ = 1.4, Zth = 0.01, (S0, G0, Z0, P0) =
(0.999, 0.001, 0, 0), and f(x) = x0.9.
perform slightly worse than the case where there are synchronization errors on a finite number of
nodes, even in the mean. We can explain this as follows: in the previous sections, we characterized
the optimal solution for the problem in §III.F under the assumption that the number of nodes was
infinite. For a finite number of nodes, even without synchronization errors, the damage sustained
by the simulated network can be different from (and potentially less than) that computed using
the computational optimal control framework.
These studies lead to the conclusion that an adversary will not be deterred by the possibility
of errors in estimation and synchronization of the malware spread, further sounding the alarm
about the emerging trend of visibility-aware malware.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper we investigated the optimal controls for the SGZP model with and without
halting with no explicit network defense (§III.A and III.B), and without halting for the case with
adaptive network defense (§III.C). This leaves open the case of the SGZP model with halting
and adaptive defense. Initial analytical investigations show that Theorem 3 is likely generalizable
to this case, barring some technical issues that will be investigated in the future. In principle,
γ can also be a variable to be optimized by the attacker in all models. Furthermore, the model
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Fig. 5: Germinators were assumed to have unbiased random synchronization errors at each time
instant with the range depicted on the x-axis. The lines shows average damage over 100 runs with
unsynchronized germinators. Here, β = 2, γ = 0.5, T = 5, (S0, G0, Z0, P0) = (0.99, 0.01, 0, 0),
f(x) = x0.5, and g(x) = kgx = 0.7x, and the simulation was run for 500 nodes (i.e., 5
germinators).
can be extended to a botnet case where the attack is unleashed only when the damage-visibility
trade-off is at the optimal point – the same arguments as in the paper would hold in that case,
with the difference that the terminal time will be free. The set-up and formulation of the visibility
problem is, to the best of our knowledge, novel, and thus leads itself to analysis both in the
mean-field regime and in more structured settings. In particular, in the mean-field case, possible
patching will be addressed at a later stage, as well as the dynamic game that would result from
such a competition.
The current work is an abstraction of practical cybersecurity problems mainly due to the
homogeneous mixing assumption. Another possible direction is to look at the optimal control of
such an epidemic in sub-populations with differentiating characteristics (e.g., location, contact
rate) as a way to relax the homogeneous mixing assumption (e.g., by following the roadmap
in [29]). Such a generalization would better model Stuxnet in particular, with the goal being
to maximize the number of infected agents in a particular region, while minimizing the total
number of detectable zombies.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: This proof follows the same structure as that of Theorem 2.
As before, we define continuous co-states (λS, λP , λZ , λ0) such that at points of continuity of
the controls:
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λ˙S = (λS − λP )βGuP + (λS − λZ)[βGuZ + γβZ]
λ˙Z = λ0g
′(Z)− λ0f ′(Z + P ) + (λS − λZ)γβS
+ (λZ − λP )piβGuh
λ˙P = −λ0f ′(Z + P ), (24)
with final state constraints:
λS(T ) = λZ(T ) = λP (T ) = 0. (25)
To characterize optimal controls, we define the Hamiltonian to be:
H(t) =λ0(f(Z + P )− g(Z)) + (λP − λZ)piβGZuh
+ (λZ − λS)[βGSuZ + γβZS] + (λP − λS)βGSuP . (26)
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle again gives the following necessary conditions for an optimal
control vector u∗:
(λS, λP , λZ , λ0) 6= ~0 λ0 ∈ {0, 1}, (27)
∀u∈U ,t∈[0,T ] H(S∗, Z∗, P ∗, u∗, λS(t), λP (t), λZ(t), λ0, t) ≥
H(S∗, Z∗, P ∗, u, λS(t), λP (t), λZ(t), λ0, t). (28)
Again, if λ0 = 0, (λS(T ), λP (T ), λZ(T ), λ0) = ~0, a contradiction, so λ0 = 1.
Now, we have:
λ˙P − λ˙Z = −g′(Z)− (λS − λZ)γβS − (λZ − λP )piβGuh
λ˙S − λ˙Z = f ′(Z + P )− g′(Z) + (λS − λP )βGuP
+ (λS − λZ)βGuZ + (λS − λZ)γβ(Z − S)
− (λZ − λP )piβGuh
λ˙S − λ˙P = f ′(Z + P ) + (λS − λZ)[βGuZ + γβZ]
+ (λS − λP )βGuP ,
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1) Structure of the optimal control: If we define:
ϕP = (λP − λS)βGS (29a)
ϕZ = (λZ − λS)βGS (29b)
ϕh = (λP − λZ)piβGZ, (29c)
then, the Hamiltonian becomes:
H(t) = f(Z + P )− g(Z) + ϕPuP + ϕZuZ + ϕhuh
+ (λZ − λS)γβZS.
Also notice that:
ϕh = pi
Z
S
(ϕP − ϕZ). (30)
The maximization of the Hamiltonian (28), added to the sum constraints for the controls (2a),
leads to the following optimality conditions for the controls:
(uP , uZ) =

(0, 0) ϕP < 0, ϕZ < 0 (31a)
(1, 0) ϕP > 0, ϕP > ϕZ (31b)
(0, 1) ϕZ > 0, ϕZ > ϕP (31c)
(?, ?) ϕZ = ϕP ≥ 0 (31d)
(?, 0) ϕP = 0, ϕZ < 0 (31e)
(0, ?) ϕZ = 0, ϕP < 0 (31f)
Furthermore,
ϕZ(t) > 0 or ϕP (t) > 0⇒ uP (t) + uZ(t) = 1, (32)
as if that is not true, we can increase H(t) by adding to either uP (t) or uZ(t), a contradiction
with the Hamiltonian maximization condition of the Maximum Principle (28). Also,
uh =

0 ϕh < 0 (33a)
1 ϕh > 0 (33b)
? ϕh = 0 (33c)
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. Using (30), we can rewrite the above as:
uh =

0 ϕP < ϕZ & Z(t) > 0 (34a)
1 ϕP > ϕZ & Z(t) > 0 (34b)
? ϕP = ϕZ or Z(t) = 0 (34c)
. From (29) and the state and costate evolution equations and after trite manipulation, we have:
ϕ˙P = −βGSf ′(Z + P ) + βGuZ(ϕZ − ϕP )
+ γβZ(ϕZ − ϕP ) (35a)
ϕ˙Z = βGS(kg − f ′(Z + P ))− γβSϕZ
+ βG(uP − piuh)(ϕP − ϕZ) (35b)
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = −(ϕP − ϕZ)(βGuZ + γβZ + βGuP − βGuh)
− βGSkg + γβSϕZ (35c)
ϕ˙h = −piβGZkg + piβGuZ(ϕP − ϕZ) + piγβZϕP . (35d)
From here on, the proof follows the same outline laid out in §IV.D.2 (in terms of finding t∗ and
t′′ and proving t′′ = 0); however, the algebraic expressions for ϕ˙Z , ϕ˙P are different and ϕh(t)
is introduced in the dynamics, necessitating the use of different and context-specific analytical
arguments.
2) Time interval leading up to T and the existence of t∗: We follow the evolution of ϕZ ,
ϕP , and ϕh for a time interval leading to T and prove the existence of t∗ such that we have
uP (t) = 1, uZ(t) = 0, and, if Z(T ) > 0, uh(t) = 1 for all t ∈ (t∗, T ) (otherwise, uh can be
arbitrary over this interval). From the terminal time costate conditions (25):
ϕP (T ) = ϕZ(T ) = ϕh(T ) = 0, (36a)
ϕ˙P (T
−) = −f ′((Z + P )(T−))βGS(T−) < 0, (36b)
ϕ˙P (T
−)− ϕ˙Z(T−) = −βGS(T−)kg < 0, (36c)
ϕ˙h(T
−) = −piβGZ(T−)kg ≤ 0. (36d)
Now, we may either have Z(T ) = 0 or Z(T ) > 0 due to Theorem 1.
We start by considering the case where Z(T ) = 0. From (3b) we have Z˙ ≥ Z(γβS−piβGuh) ≥
M6Z for t ∈ [0, T ], where M6 > 0 is an upper-bound on the γβS over the whole interval.
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Therefore, Z(t)eM6(t−T ) ≤ Z(T ) = 0. Thus we must have Z(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This
means that Z˙(t) = βGSuZ = 0 over this interval, which from Theorem 1 leads to uZ(t) = 0 for
all t ∈ [0, T ]. Furthermore, as Z(t) is never positive, uh(t) will have no effect on the dynamics
of the system, and can thus be arbitrary. Finally, (35a) and (36a) tell us that ϕP (T ) = 0 and
ϕ˙P (t) = −βGSf ′(P ) < 0 over this interval, which leads to ϕP (t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, T ) due to
continuity of the states and co-states and the differentiability of ϕP (t) using an integral argument.
This, along with uZ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] and (32) leads to uP (t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ) (and
therefore t∗ = 0). So in sum, for all t ∈ [0, T ), uP (t) = 1, uZ(t) = 0, with uh(t) taking any
arbitrary value. This agrees with the structure set forth in Theorem 3.
Henceforth, we examine the case where Z(T ) > 0. From (36a) and (36c), as before, ϕP (t) >
max{ϕZ(t), 0} for some interval leading up to T due to the continuity of the states and costates
and using the definition of a left derivative. Let (t∗, T ) be the largest interval over which this
holds for t ∈ (t∗, T ) for some t∗ < T , leading to the fact that for all such t, uP (t) = 1 and
uZ(t) = 0 due to (31b).
We now prove that for t ∈ [t∗, T ], Z(t) > 0. If Z(τ) = 0 at any τ ∈ (t∗, T ), as uZ(t) = 0
in this interval and from (3b) we will have Z˙ = Z(γβS−piβGuh) < M7Z for t ∈ [τ, T ] and
for some M7 > 0 which is an upper-bound to γβS. This leads to Z(t) ≤ Z(τ)eM7(t−τ) = 0,
or Z(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [τ, T ] and especially Z(T ) = 0 which is a contradiction. The same
reasoning also applies to t = t∗ due to continuity. So for t ∈ [t∗, T ], Z(t) > 0. Thus, from (34b)
and the definition of t∗, we have uh(t) = 1 for all t ∈ (t∗, T ).
So if t∗ = 0, we have uP (t) = 1, uZ(t) = 0, and uh(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ), which agrees
with Theorem 3. Now we consider t∗ > 0.
3) Time interval leading up to t∗ > 0 and the existence of t′′: We now look at the evolution of
ϕZ , ϕP , and ϕh for a time interval leading to t∗ > 0, and show t′′ exists such that for t ∈ (t′′, t∗)
we must have uP (t) = 0, uh(t) = 0, and uZ(t) = 1. For t ∈ (t∗, T ), and after replacing optimal
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controls, (35) becomes:
ϕ˙P = −βGSf ′(Z + P ) + γβZ(ϕZ − ϕP ) (37a)
ϕ˙Z = βGS(kg − f ′(Z + P )) + βG(1− pi)(ϕP − ϕZ)
− γβSϕZ (37b)
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = −(ϕP − ϕZ)(γβZ + βG(1− pi))− βGSkg
+ γβSϕZ , (37c)
ϕ˙h = piZ(γβϕP − βGkg). (37d)
It can be seen that ϕ˙P (t) < 0 for t ∈ (t∗, T ) (as ϕP (t) > ϕZ(t) and f ′(Z(t) +P (t)) > 0 in this
interval). This, coupled with ϕP (T ) = 0 ((36a)) leads to ϕP (t∗) > 0 due to continuity and an
integral argument. Thus, we must have ϕZ(t∗) = ϕP (t∗) > 0 for t∗ > 0.
For t ∈ (t∗, T ):
Z˙ + P˙ = βGS + γβZS > 0. (38)
Now, if kg − f ′((Z + P )(t∗)) ≥ 0, then kg − f ′((Z + P )(t)) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ (t∗, T ) due to the
convexity of kg − f(·) in its argument and as Z + P is strictly increasing in this interval (from
(38)). From (37b), ϕ˙Z > −γβSϕZ ≥ −M8ϕZ for all t ∈ (t∗, T ), with M8 being an upper-bound
on γβS. Therefore, ϕZ(t∗) < ϕZ(T )e−M8(t
∗−T ) = 0 due to an integral argument, which means
that ϕP (t∗) > 0 ≥ ϕZ(t∗). This contradicts the starting assumption of this argument, which was
ϕP (t
∗) = ϕZ(t∗).
Therefore, from here on we will consider kg < f ′((Z + P )(t∗)). At such a point t∗, from
(37b) and the continuity of the states and co-states:
(ϕ˙P (t
∗+)− ϕ˙Z(t∗+)) = βS(t∗)[γϕZ(t∗)−Gkg]. (39)
Now, (39) should be positive, because if this derivative was strictly negative, the definition
of the right-derivative would show that ϕZ(t) > ϕP (t) for t in an interval starting from t∗, a
contradiction with the definition of t∗. So, as S(t∗) > 0 from Theorem 1:
βS(t∗)[γϕZ(t∗)−Gkg] ≥ 0⇒ ϕZ(t∗) ≥ Gkg
γ
. (40)
Now, we can see from a continuity argument on (37b) (given that ϕZ(t∗) = ϕP (t∗) > 0) that
ϕ˙Z(t
∗−) < 0. Thus ϕZ(t) > ϕZ(t∗) > 0 for some interval leading up to t∗ due to the definition
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of a left-derivative. Thus, from (40) we must have: ϕZ(t) >
Gkg
γ
(and therefore also ϕZ(t) > 0)
for t in some interval leading up to t∗. Let (t′, t∗) be the maximal such interval. In this interval,
from (37c), we have
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z > −(ϕP − ϕZ)(γβZ + βG(1− pi)) ≥ −M9(ϕP − ϕZ),
where M9 > 0 is an upper-bound on the continuous expression γβZ + βG(1− pi). So for any t
in this interval, (ϕP (t)− ϕZ(t)) < (ϕP (t∗)− ϕZ(t∗))e−M9(t−t∗) = 0.
Thus, ϕP (t) < ϕZ(t) for t ∈ (t′, t∗). As ϕZ(t∗) > 0, due to the continuity of the states and
co-states, there exists a maximal interval (t′′, t∗) such that ϕZ(t) > max{ϕP (t), 0}. Following
from (31c) , for t ∈ (t′′, t∗) we must have uP (t) = 0 and uZ(t) = 1.
As ϕZ(t) > ϕP (t), from (34a) and (34c) we have Z(t)uh(t) = 0 for t ∈ (t′′, t∗). This leads
to Z˙(t) > 0 in this interval (from (3b)), which combined with Theorem 1 leads to Z(t) > 0 in
this interval. Therefore, from (34a) we can also conclude that in this interval, uh(t) = 0.
4) Proof of t′′ = 0: If t′′ = 0, this concludes our specification of the structure, which agrees
with Theorem 3. Thus, henceforth we consider the case where t′′ > 0, and thus either ϕZ(t′′) =
ϕP (t
′′) or ϕZ(t′′) = 0.
For t ∈ (t′′, t∗), (35) becomes:
ϕ˙P = −βGSf ′(Z + P ) + βG(ϕZ − ϕP ) + γβZ(ϕZ − ϕP )
ϕ˙Z = βGS(kg − f ′(Z + P ))− γβSϕZ (41a)
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = −(ϕP − ϕZ)(βG+ γβZ)− βGSkg + γβSϕZ (41b)
ϕ˙h = −piβGZkg + piβG(ϕP − ϕZ) + piγβZϕP ,
Now, for t ∈ (t′′, t∗),
kg − f ′((Z + P )(t)) < kg − f ′((Z + P )(t∗)) < 0 (42)
as kg − f(·) is convex and in this interval and P˙ (t) + Z˙(t) = Z˙(t) = βGS + γβZS > 0
as uZ(t) = 1, and uP (t) = uh(t) = 0. So from (41a), ϕ˙Z < −γβSϕZ ≤ −M10ϕZ with
M10 > 0 being the upper-bound of the continuous γβS, and therefore for all t ∈ (t′′, t∗),
ϕZ(t) ≥ ϕZ(t∗)e−M10(t−t∗). As ϕZ(t∗) > 0, ϕZ(t) is bounded away from zero, which leads to
ϕZ(t
′′) > 0 due to continuity.
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So we must have ϕP (t′′) = ϕZ(t′′). In this case, from (41b) we have (ϕ˙P (t′′+)−ϕ˙Z(t′′+)) ≤ 0,
as if it is strictly positive, an integral argument will lead to a contradiction with ϕP (t) < ϕZ(t)
for t ∈ (t′′, t∗). Using the continuity of the states and co-states, as well as the fact that S(t′′) > 0
from Theorem 1, (21b) becomes: ϕ˙P (t′′+)− ϕ˙Z(t′′+) = βS(t′′)[γϕZ(t′′)−Gkg] ≤ 0 and so:
ϕZ(t
′′) ≤ Gkg
γ
, (43)
From (42) and (41a), ϕ˙Z < −γβSϕZ < −M10ϕZ < 0. So,
ϕZ(t
′′) > ϕZ(t∗). (44)
But (40) and (43) lead to ϕZ(t′′) ≤ ϕZ(t∗), which contradicts (44).
Thus t′′ = 0, and this concludes our specification of the structure of the optimal controls
which conform to the structure set out in Theorem 3.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 FOR ADAPTIVE DEFENSE MODEL
We first provide a general framework (akin to the one presented for Theorem 2), and then we
differentiate the analysis based on the type of adaptive defense used by the network: Constant
β(Z) in §Appendix B.B, affine β(Z) in §Appendix B.C, and sigmoid β(Z) in §Appendix B.D
As before, define the continuous co-states (λS, λP , λZ , λ0) such that at points of continuity of
the controls:
λ˙S = β(Z)[(λS − λP )GuP + (λS − λZ)(GuZ + γZ)]
λ˙Z = −λ0f ′(Z + P ) + (λS − λZ)γβ(Z)S
+ β′(Z)[(λS − λP )GSuP + (λS − λZ)GSuZ
+ (λS − λZ)γZS]
λ˙P = −λ0f ′(Z + P ), (45)
with final co-state constraints:
λS(T ) = λZ(T ) = λP (T ) = 0. (46)
To characterize optimal controls, we define the Hamiltonian:
H(t) := λ0f(Z + P ) + (λP − λS)β(Z)GSuP
+(λZ − λS)β(Z)GSuZ + (λZ − λS)γβ(Z)ZS (47)
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Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle [38, p.182] gives us the following necessary conditions for
optimality for an optimal control vector u∗:
(λS, λP , λZ , λ0) 6= ~0, λ0 ∈ {0, 1}, (48)
∀u∈U ,t∈[0,T ] H(S∗, Z∗, P ∗, u∗, λS(t), λP (t), λZ(t), λ0, t) ≥
H(S∗, Z∗, P ∗, u, λS(t), λP (t), λZ(t), λ0, t). (49)
But if λ0 = 0, (λS(T ), λP (T ), λZ(T ), λ0) = ~0, a contradiction, so λ0 = 1.
A. General structure of the optimal control
If we define:
ϕP = (λP − λS)β(Z)GS (50a)
ϕZ = (λZ − λS)β(Z)GS, (50b)
then, the Hamiltonian becomes:
H(t) = f(Z + P ) + ϕPuP + ϕZuZ + (λZ − λS)γβ(Z)ZS.
The maximization of the Hamiltonian (49), added to the sum constraints for the controls (2a),
leads to (15) as the optimality conditions for the controls:
ϕZ(t) > 0 or ϕP (t) > 0⇒ uP (t) + uZ(t) = 1, (51)
as if that is not true, we can add to the instantaneous value of H(t) by adding to either uP (t)
or uZ(t), a contradiction with the Hamiltonian maximization condition (49).
From (50) and the state (5) and costate (45) evolution equations and after some manipulation,
we have:
ϕ˙P = −β(Z)GSf ′(Z + P ) + β′(Z)SϕP [GuZ + γZ]
−(ϕP − ϕZ)β(Z)[GuZ + γZ] (52a)
ϕ˙Z = −β(Z)GSf ′(Z + P )− ϕPGuPβ′(Z)S
−ϕZβ(Z)γS + (ϕP − ϕZ)β(Z)GuP , (52b)
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = −(ϕP − ϕZ)β(Z)[G(uZ + uP ) + γ(Z + S)]
+ϕPS
[
γβ(Z) + β′(Z)[G(uZ + uP ) + γZ]
]
(52c)
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Again, the proof follows the outline laid out in §IV.D.2 (i.e., proving the existence of t∗ and t′,
which are, however, defined differently, and proving t′ = 0 for t∗ > 0), with the difference that
the algebraic expressions for ϕ˙Z and ϕ˙P , and therefore all subsequent analytical arguments, will
change.
1) Time interval leading up to T and the existence of t∗: We follow the evolution of ϕZ and
ϕP for a time interval leading to T and prove the existence of t∗ such that we have uP (t) = 1,
and uZ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ (t∗, T ).
From the terminal time costate conditions (46) and their directional derivatives (52), we have:
ϕP (T ) = ϕZ(T ) = 0, (53a)
ϕ˙P (T
−) = ϕ˙Z(T−) = −β(Z)GSf ′(Z + P ) < 0. (53b)
So, due to continuity of the states and co-states, there is an interval leading up to T, over which
we have ϕP (t) > 0 and ϕZ(t) > 0. Let (t∗, T ) be the maximal length interval with this property.
For t ∈ (t∗, T ), equation (51) leads to
uZ(t) + uP (t) = 1. (54)
Now, for t ∈ (t∗, T ), (52c) becomes:
ϕ˙P (t)− ϕ˙Z(t) =− (ϕP − ϕZ)β(Z)[G+ γ(Z + S)]
+ ϕPS
[
γβ(Z) + β′(Z)[G+ γZ]
]
(55)
The rest of the analysis depends on the β(Z) function - we present different arguments for
β(Z)’s that are constant, affine, and sigmoid (§Appendices B.B, B.C, and B.D, respectively).
For the affine case (§B.C), the analysis needs to be broken down into different cases according
to the value of Z(T ) in relation to the constant 1
2
[
βmax
a
− G
γ
]. When β(Z) is a sigmoid (§B.D),
we use different analytical arguments to prove the result depending on whether eα(Z(T )−Zth)(1−
α
γ
G − αZ(T )) + 1 is less than, equal to, or greater than zero. For the simple case of constant
β(Z) (§B.B), no such conditional arguments are needed.
B. Constant β(Z)
Assume β(Z) = β.8 In this case, there is no penalty for creating zombies, and we expect
zombies to be created for the whole time period. Then for t ∈ (t∗, T ), (55) becomes:(ϕ˙P −
8Note that this is a case of the model in §IV.C with g ≡ 0.
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ϕ˙Z)(t) = ϕPSγβ − (ϕP − ϕZ)β[G+ γ(Z + S)] ≥ −(ϕP − ϕZ)M11, for all t ∈ (t∗, T ) and for
some M11 > 0 that is an upper-bound for β(G+γ(Z+S)), as ϕP (t)S(t)γβ > 0 in this interval.
Therefore, for t ∈ (t∗, T ), ϕP (t) − ϕZ(t) < [ϕP (T ) − ϕZ(T )]e−M11(t−T ) = 0 (from (53a)), and
thus ϕP (t) < ϕZ(t) for t ∈ (t∗, T ).
Due to the continuity of the states and co-states and from the definition of t∗, there exists an
interval (t′, T ), with t′ ≤ t∗ such that ϕZ > ϕP and ϕZ > 0. These conditions, coupled with
(15c) lead to uP (t) = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 for all t ∈ (t′, T ).
We now prove t′ = 0. If this does not hold, either ϕZ(t′) = ϕP (t′) or ϕZ(t′) = 0 for some
t′ > 0 due to continuity of the states and co-states.
Since uP (t) = 0 for t ∈ (t′, T ), (52b) becomes: ϕ˙Z(t) = −β(Z)GSf ′(Z+P )−ϕZβ(Z)γS <
0, which leads to ϕZ(t′) > ϕZ(T ) = 0. Thus, ϕZ(t′) cannot be equal to zero.
If ϕZ(t′) = ϕP (t′), then from (52c), β′(Z) = 0 for constant β(Z), and the continuity of
the states and co-states:
(
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z
)
(t′+) = ϕP (t′)S(t′)γβ = ϕZ(t′)S(t′)γβ > 0, leading to the
existence of an interval (t′, t′′) over which ϕP (t) > ϕZ(t), a contradiction with the definition of
t′.
Thus, t′ = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 and uP (t) = 0 for all t, which agrees with the statement of
Theorem 2 and our intuition that zombies will be created for the entire period.
C. Affine β(Z)
Assume β(Z) = −aZ + βmax, with 0 < a ≤ βmax (as βmax is an upperbound on this β(Z)
and β(Z) > 0). Then, for t ∈ (t∗, T ), (55) becomes:
ϕ˙P (t)− ϕ˙Z(t) = −aϕPS
[
γ(2Z − βmax
a
) +G
]
−(ϕP − ϕZ)(−aZ + βmax)[G+ γ(Z + S)] (56)
Now we break down the situations that can arise based on the value of Z(T ) with respect to
the fixed 1
2
[βmax
a
− G
γ
]:
1) Z(T ) ≤ 1
2
[
βmax
a
− G
γ
]: Note that for this case, we must have 1
2
[βmax
a
− G
γ
] ≥ 0 due to
Theorem 1.
We first consider the sub-case where Z(T ) = 1
2
[βmax
a
− G
γ
] = 0. Here, we must have Z˙(t) = 0
for all t as Z˙(t) ≥ 0 for all t and as states are continuous. The only way for Z˙(t) = 0 for
all t is for us to have Z0 = 0 and uZ(t) = 0 for all t < T (due to Theorem 1). This leads to
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(52a) becoming ϕ˙P (t) = −β(0)GS(t)f ′(P (t)) < 0 for all t < T , and thus ϕP (t) > 0. This fact,
combined with uZ(t) = 0 for all t and (15b) leads to uP (t) = 1 for all t (i.e., t∗ = 0 in the
statement of Theorem 2).
Otherwise, we either have (i) Z(T ) = 1
2
[βmax
a
− G
γ
] > 0 or (ii) Z(T ) < 1
2
[βmax
a
− G
γ
].
(i) In this case, from (5) (for which β(Z) > 0 and G > 0), Theorem 1 (which specifies
S(T ) > 0), and continuity of the states, we have Z˙(T−) > 0. Thus Z(t) < 1
2
[βmax
a
− G
γ
] for some
(t′′, T ). Therefore, as Z˙(t) ≥ 0 for all t, so Z(t) < 1
2
[βmax
a
− G
γ
] for all t < T .
(ii) Since Z˙ ≥ 0 from (5) and Theorem 1, in this case we also have Z(t) < 1
2
[βmax
a
− G
γ
] for
all t < T .
Therefore for both (i) and (ii), γβmax − 2γaZ(t)−Ga > 0 for all t < T .
From (56) and for all t ∈ (t∗, T ): ϕ˙P (t)−ϕ˙Z(t) > −(ϕP−ϕZ)β(Z)[G+γ(Z+S)] ≥ −(ϕP−
ϕZ)M12, for some M12 > 0 which is an upper-bound to the continuous β(Z)[G + γ(Z + S)]
over this interval. Therefore, for t ∈ (t∗, T ), ϕP (t)− ϕZ(t) < [ϕP (T )− ϕZ(T )]e−M12(t−T ) = 0,
and thus ϕP (t) < ϕZ(t) for t ∈ (t∗, T ).
Due to the continuity of the states and co-states and because for t ∈ (t∗, T ), ϕZ(t) > 0, there
exists an interval (t′, T ), with t′ ≤ t∗ such that both ϕZ(t) > ϕP (t) and ϕZ(t) > 0. These
conditions, coupled with (15c) lead to uP (t) = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 for all t ∈ (t′, T ).
We now prove t′ = 0. If this does not hold, either ϕZ(t′) = 0 or ϕZ(t′) = ϕP (t′) for some
t′ > 0 due to continuity of the states and co-states.
For t ∈ (t′, T ) (52b) becomes, ϕ˙Z(t) = −β(Z)GSf ′(Z + P )− ϕZβ(Z)γS < 0, which leads
to ϕZ(t′) > ϕZ(T ) = 0.
So we must have ϕZ(t′) = ϕP (t′) for t′ > 0. From (56) and the continuity of the states
and co-states,
(
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z
)
(t′+) = ϕP (t′)S(t′)
[
γβmax − 2γaZ(t′) − Ga
]
= ϕZ(t
′)S(t′)
[
γβmax −
2γaZ(t′)−Ga] > 0, leading to the existence of an interval (t′, t′′) over which ϕP (t) > ϕZ(t),
a contradiction with the definition of t′.
Thus, t′ = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 and uP (t) = 0 for all t, which agrees with the statement of
Theorem 2.
2) Z(T ) > 1
2
[
βmax
a
−G
γ
]: Due to the continuity of the states, Z(t) > 1
2
[βmax
a
−G
γ
] for t ∈ (t1, T )
for some t1. Recall that for t ∈ (t∗, T ), ϕP (t) > 0. Thus, for t ∈ (t2, T ), where t2 = max{t∗, t1}
and with M12 again defined as the upper-bound to the continuous β(Z)[G + γ(Z + S)], (56)
leads to: ϕ˙P (t)− ϕ˙Z(t) < −(ϕP − ϕZ)β(Z)[G + γ(Z + S)] ≤ −(ϕP − ϕZ)M12. Therefore, in
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this interval, ϕP (t) − ϕZ(t) > [ϕP (T ) − ϕZ(T )]e−M12(t−T ) = 0, and thus ϕP (t) > ϕZ(t) and
ϕP (t) > 0 for t ∈ (t2, T ).
Now, due to the continuity of the states and co-states, define (t3, T ) to be the maximal length
interval over which ϕP (t) > max{ϕZ(t), 0}. Note that for t ∈ (t3, T ) we have uZ(t) = 0 and
uP (t) = 1 due to (15b).
Due to continuity of the states and co-states, either t3 = 0, in which case uZ(t) = 0 and
uP (t) = 1 for all t (agreeing with the structure of Theorem 2), or we have a t3 > 0 such that
ϕP (t3) = 0 or ϕP (t3) = ϕZ(t3) > 0.
From (52a), Theorem 1, and from the definition of t3, for t ∈ (t3, T ) we have, ϕ˙P =
−β(Z)GSf ′(Z + P ) − (ϕP − ϕZ)β(Z)γZ − aSϕPγZ < −aSϕPγZ ≤ −M13ϕP , for some
M13 > 0 that is an upper-bound to the continuous a1SγZ over this interval. Thus, ϕP (t3) >
ϕP (T )e
−M13(t3−T ) = 0. So for t3 > 0, we must have ϕP (t3) = ϕZ(t3) > 0. From the continuity
of the states and co-states, there must exist an interval leading up to t3 such that ϕZ(t) > 0 and
ϕP (t) > 0. Let (t4, t3) be the maximal-length interval with such a property. Notice that (51) also
applies, leading to uP (t) + uZ(t) = 1 for t ∈ (t4, t3).
Furthermore, also from continuity, (56) becomes:
(ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z)(t+3 ) = −aϕP (t3)S(t3)
[
γ(2Z(t3)− βmax
a
) +G
]
(57)
But if ϕ˙P (t+3 ) − ϕ˙Z(t+3 ) < 0, then due to continuity and the definition of the derivative, we
must have an interval starting from t3 where ϕZ(t) > ϕP (t), which contradicts the definition
of t3 (which stated that over an interval starting at t3, ϕP (t) > max{ϕP (t), 0}). So we must
have ϕ˙P (t+3 ) − ϕ˙Z(t+3 ) ≥ 0. From (57) this is equivalent to [γ(2Z(t3) − βmaxa ) + G
] ≤ 0, or
Z(t3) ≤ 12 [βmaxa − Gγ ].
Following the same set of arguments as presented in §B.C.1 for the case of Z(T ) ≤ 1
2
[βmax
a
−G
γ
]
and retracing them for Z(t3) ≤ 12 [βmaxa − Gγ ] (with t3 replacing T in all arguments) shows that
the structure postulated in Theorem 2 holds.
Thus, all possible state and co-state trajectories lead to the structure postulated in Theorem
2.
D. Sigmoid β(Z)
Assume βZ =
β0
1 + eα(Z−Zth)
, with 0 < Zth < 1 being a fixed threshold and α > 0 denoting
the sharpness of the cut-off. This simulates a threshold-like detection of zombies by a network
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administrator. In this case, (52c) becomes:
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = −(ϕP − ϕZ)β(Z)[G(uZ + uP ) + γ(Z + S)]
+
β0γϕPS
[
eα(Z−Zth)(1− α
γ
G(uz + uP )− αZ) + 1
]
(1 + eα(Z−Zth))2
(58)
Define: Ψ(Z, uZ + uP ) := eα(Z−Zth)(1− αγG(uz + uP )− αZ) + 1. Then (58) becomes:
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z = −(ϕP − ϕZ)β(Z)[G(uZ + uP ) + γ(Z + S)]
+
β0γϕPS
(1 + eα(Z−Zth))2
Ψ(Z, uZ + uP ) (59)
Now, for possible intervals where uZ + uP is a constant c ∈ [0, 1], Ψ(Z, c) is a function of one
variable (Z). We can see that at points of continuity of the controls and in intervals where it is
defined, Ψ(Z, c) is also continuous and differentiable. Furthermore, we can see that at points of
continuity of the controls in these intervals, we have:
dΨ(Z, c)
dZ
= −α2eα(Z−Zth)(G
γ
c+ Z) < 0 (60)
Now we break down the situations that can arise based on the value of Ψ(Z(T ), 1):
1) Ψ(Z(T ), 1) > 0: From Z˙ ≥ 0 ((5) and Theorem 1) and the continuity of the states, we
have Z(t) ≤ Z(T ) for all t. Now for t ∈ (t∗, T ), as the sum of the controls is constant and equal
to one due to (54), we will have Ψ(Z(t), 1) ≥ Ψ(Z(T ), 1) > 0 due to (60). Thus from (59) and
for all t ∈ (t∗, T ) at which the controls are continuous: ϕ˙P (t)− ϕ˙Z(t) > −(ϕP −ϕZ)β(Z)[G+
γ(Z + S)] ≥ −(ϕP − ϕZ)M14, for some M14 > 0 which is an upper-bound to the continuous
β(Z)[G+γ(Z+S)]. Therefore, for t ∈ (t∗, T ), ϕP (t)−ϕZ(t) < [ϕP (T )−ϕZ(T )]e−M14(t−T ) = 0,
and thus ϕP (t) < ϕZ(t) for t ∈ (t∗, T ).
Due to the continuity of the states and co-states and from the definition of t∗, there exists
an interval (t′, T ), with t′ ≤ t∗ such that ϕZ(t) > ϕP (t) and ϕZ(t) > 0. These conditions,
coupled with (15c) lead to uP (t) = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 for all t ∈ (t′, T ), with the corollary that
uP (t) + uZ(t) = 1.
We now prove t′ = 0. If this does not hold, either ϕZ(t′) = 0 or ϕZ(t′) = ϕP (t′) > 0 for
t′ > 0 due to continuity of the states and co-states.
For t ∈ (t′, T ), as uP (t) = 0, (52b) becomes: ϕ˙Z(t) = −β(Z)GSf ′(Z + P )− ϕZβ(Z)γS <
0, as each term in the right hand side is strictly positive in the interval. Now, if we have
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ϕZ(t
′) = 0, from this time-derivative and continuity of the states and co-states we must have
ϕZ(t
′) > ϕZ(T ) = 0. Thus, ϕZ(t′) = 0 is ruled out.
On the other hand, if ϕZ(t′) = ϕP (t′) > 0, then from (59) and the continuity of the states
and co-states:
(
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z
)
(t′+) =
β0γϕP (t
′)S(t′)
(1 + eα(Z(t′)−Zth))2
Ψ(Z(t′), 1) > 0, leading to the existence of
an interval (t′, t′′) over which ϕP (t) > ϕZ(t), a contradiction with the definition of t′.
Thus, t′ = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 and uP (t) = 0 for all t, which agrees with the statement of
Theorem 2.
2) Ψ(Z(T ), 1) = 0 and Z(T ) > 0: We have Z˙(T−) > 0 (from (5), Theorem 1, and continuity)
which leads to Z(t) < Z(T ) for an interval leading up to t. As Z˙ ≥ 0, we can extend Z(t) <
Z(T ) to all t. Now for t ∈ (t∗, T ), from (54), we will have Ψ(Z(t), 1) > Ψ(Z(T ), 1) = 0 due
to (60). We now prove t′ = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 and uP (t) = 0 for all t.
From (54), (59), for all t ∈ (t∗, T ) (over which ϕP (t) > 0): ϕ˙P (t) − ϕ˙Z(t) > −(ϕP −
ϕZ)β(Z)[G+ γ(Z + S)] ≥ −(ϕP − ϕZ)M12 for some M12 > 0 which is an upper-bound to the
continuous β(Z)[G + γ(Z + S)] over this interval. Therefore, for t ∈ (t∗, T ), ϕP (t)− ϕZ(t) <
[ϕP (T )− ϕZ(T )]e−M12(t−T ) = 0, and thus ϕP (t) < ϕZ(t) for t ∈ (t∗, T ).
Due to the continuity of the states and co-states and because for t ∈ (t∗, T ), ϕZ(t) > 0, there
exists an interval (t′, T ), with t′ ≤ t∗ such that both ϕZ(t) > ϕP (t) and ϕZ(t) > 0. These
conditions, coupled with (15c) lead to uP (t) = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 for all t ∈ (t′, T ).
We now prove t′ = 0. If this does not hold, either (i) ϕZ(t′) = 0 or (ii) ϕZ(t′) = ϕP (t′) for
some t′ > 0 due to continuity of the states and co-states.
For t ∈ (t′, T ) (52b) becomes: ϕ˙Z(t) = −β(Z)GSf ′(Z + P )− ϕZβ(Z)γS < 0, which leads
to ϕZ(t′) > ϕZ(T ) = 0.
So for t′ > 0 we must have ϕZ(t′) = ϕP (t′). From (59) and the continuity of the states and co-
states:
(
ϕ˙P − ϕ˙Z
)
(t′+) =
β0γϕP (t
′)S(t′)
(1 + eα(Z(t′)−Zth))2
Ψ(Z(t′), 1) =
β0γϕZ(t
′)S(t′)
(1 + eα(Z(t′)−Zth))2
Ψ(Z(t′), 1) > 0,
leading to the existence of an interval (t′, t′′) over which ϕP (t) > ϕZ(t), a contradiction with
the definition of t′.
Thus, t′ = 0 and uZ(t) = 1 and uP (t) = 0 for all t, which agrees with the statement of
Theorem 2.
3) Ψ(Z(T ), 1) = 0 and Z(T ) = 0: We must have Z˙(t) = 0 for all t as Z˙ ≥ 0 and as states
are continuous. The only way for Z˙(t) = 0 for all t is for us to have Z0 = 0 and uZ(t) = 0 for
all t < T (due to Theorem 1). This leads to (52a) becoming ϕ˙P (t) = −β(0)GS(t)f ′(P (t)) < 0
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for all t < T , and thus ϕP (t) > 0. This fact, combined with uZ(t) = 0 for all t and (15b) leads
to uP (t) = 1 for all t.
4) Ψ(Z(T ), 1) < 0: Due to the continuity of the states, Ψ(Z(t), 1) < 0 for t ∈ (t1, T ) for
some t1. Thus, (59) leads to ϕ˙P (t)−ϕ˙Z(t) < −(ϕP−ϕZ)β(Z)[G+γ(Z+S)] ≤ −(ϕP−ϕZ)M12,
for t ∈ (t2, T ), where t2 = max{t∗, t1} and with M12 defined as before (an upper-bound to the
continuous β(Z)[G+ γ(Z + S)] over this interval). Therefore, in this interval, ϕP (t)−ϕZ(t) >
[ϕP (T )− ϕZ(T )]e−M12(t−T ) = 0, and thus ϕP (t) > ϕZ(t) and ϕP (t) > 0 for t ∈ (t2, T ).
Now, due to the continuity of the states and co-states, define (t3, T ) to be the maximal length
interval over which ϕP (t) > ϕZ(t) and ϕP (t) > 0. Note that for t ∈ (t3, T ) we have (due to
(15b)) uZ(t) = 0 and uP (t) = 1.
Due to continuity of the states and co-states, either t3 = 0, in which case uZ(t) = 0 and
uP (t) = 1 for all t, or we have a t3 > 0 such that (i) ϕP (t3) = 0 or (ii) ϕP (t3) = ϕZ(t3) > 0.
From (52a), Theorem 1, and from the definition of t3, for t ∈ (t3, T ) we have: ϕ˙P =
−β(Z)GSf ′(Z+P )−(ϕP −ϕZ)β(Z)γZ− αβ0γe
α(Z−Zth)
(1 + eα(Z−Zth))2
SϕPZ < −αβ0γe
α(Z−Zth)SZ
(1 + eα(Z−Zth))2
ϕP ≤
−M15ϕP , for some M15 > 0 that is an upper-bound to the continuous αβ0γe
α(Z−Zth)SZ
(1 + eα(Z−Zth))2
. Thus,
ϕP (t3) > ϕP (T )e
−M15(t3−T ) = 0.
So for t3 > 0 we must have ϕP (t3) = ϕZ(t3) > 0. From the continuity of the states and
co-states, there must exist an interval leading up to t3 such that ϕZ(t) > 0 and ϕP (t) > 0.
Let (t4, t3) be the maximal-length interval with such a property. Notice that (51) also applies,
leading to uP (t) + uZ(t) = 1 for t ∈ (t4, t3).
Furthermore, also from continuity, (59) becomes:
ϕ˙P (t
+
3 )− ϕ˙Z(t+3 ) =
β0γϕP (t3)S(t3)
(1 + eα(Z(t3)−Zth))2
Ψ(Z(t3), 1) (61)
But if ϕ˙P (t+3 )− ϕ˙Z(t+3 ) < 0, then due to continuity and the definition of the derivative, we must
have an interval starting from t3 where ϕZ(t) > ϕP (t), which contradicts the definition of t3. So
we must have ϕ˙P (t+3 )− ϕ˙Z(t+3 ) ≥ 0. From (57) this is equivalent to Ψ(Z(t3), 1) ≥ 0. Following
the same arguments presented in §B.D.1, §B.D.2, and §B.D.3 for the case of Ψ(Z(T ), 1) ≥ 0
and retracing them for Ψ(Z(t3), 1) ≥ 0 (with t3 replacing T ) shows Theorem 2’s structure holds.
Thus, Theorem 2 holds for all possible trajectories.
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